

Accomplishments of the 1968 Target Oriented Display

1. The TOD for the first time displays the resources of nearly all of the U.S. Intelligence Community by geographic and subject objectives. It has provided us with our first explicit display of our resources across organizational and program lines offering insights of a specificity not heretofore available.

2. The 1968 TOD effort has provided us with a working base of data, methodology, and machine data-handling experience, which can now be put to practical use to produce a comprehensive multi-year summary of Intelligence Community programs in terms of their outputs, costs, and financing needs. The extension and improvement of TOD can equip the Intelligence Community with a Program and Financial Plan (PFP) as defined in the Planning, Programming, and Budget System requirements of the Bureau of the Budget (BOB Bulletin 68-9). As such, it will also be compatible with the Defense Department FYDP (i.e., the DOD PFP).

3. In providing an initial focus on the objectives against which our intelligence resources are displayed, we have also identified limitations of the TOD program structure. As an intermediate objective, it has demonstrated that the project and should be further developed in order to relate their resources to the ultimate purpose of our intelligence effort -- the information needed to support foreign policy and defense program decisions.

Limitations of the 1968 TOD Effort

1. The 1968 TOD effort addressed itself to only two program years, FY 1967 and 1968. BOB and DOD requirements for a Program and Financial Plan (PFI) call for a seven year period: the past, current, and budget year and four future years.

2. The target (or output) oriented categories of the current TOD are limited for the most part to the area and subject objectives of our intelligence resources, such as the USSR's Strategic Offensive Forces. As such, they do not further deal with the purposes for which the resources are to be made available against these targets, such as information for tactical warning (i.e., imminence of hostile action), foreign order of battle information, information on foreign weapon system characteristics. It is recognized that ultimate purposes must be the subject of analytical effort.

however, it is believed that a greater attempt at mission orientation of the resources should be made. (For example, the ultimate purpose of the Strategic Retaliatory Forces in DOD Program I is to deter nuclear war and limit damage; however, the aircraft, missile and submarine forces in that program's sub-categories are the units which relate to the mission and its ultimate purpose.)

3. Another limitation of the initial TOD is due to the existence of resources for some activities which have not been adequately and meaningfully distributed to defined functions and targets. In addition, large R&D resource outlays have not been related to specific intelligence objectives and purposes with the precision to be desired.

4. The absence of an inventory of current and planned capital resources (i.e., a Force Tab of installations by type and/or primary equipment such as planes, drones, ships, radars, etc.) in the current TOD should be corrected in order that these resources may be related to the cost outlays and to provide an initial understanding and view of the cost/capability relationship over time.

5. Finally, the geographic categories in the current TOD with the principal exceptions of the USSR and Communist China, consist mainly of geographic regions such as Communist Asia and the Near East. Further country definition is required, particularly in those regions where intelligence objectives are likely to be critically over the planning period covered.